IN RE JACLYN N.
IN RE JACLYN N.
In re JACLYN N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
GLENDA N., Defendant and Appellant.
No. B219876.
Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Four.
Filed September 20, 2010.
Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Judith A. Luby, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Glenda N. appeals from a juvenile court order declaring her adopted child, Jaclyn, a dependent of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (section 300), subdivisions (b) and (d). Glenda contends there is no substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional findings of the dependency court that she reasonably should have known that Jaclyn was being sexually molested by both Glenda's adult son and her husband. Glenda does not contest, however, that jurisdiction was properly sustained on the grounds that she failed to protect Jaclyn from physical abuse and was unwilling to have the minor in her home. Because Mother concedes jurisdiction was properly exercised by the dependency court, we need not and do not reach her contention that some of the court's jurisdictional findings were not supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm the court's order sustaining the section 300 petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a section 300 petition regarding minor Jaclyn, alleging that jurisdiction was proper under subdivisions (a), (b), and (d). The petition was triggered by Jaclyn's disclosure to police that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather and her adult brother Christian, and had been physically abused by Christian as well. According to Jaclyn, the molestation always occurred when her mother Glenda was not home, and Jaclyn did not tell her mother about it because she knew her mother would not believe her. With respect to the physical abuse, however, she alleged Glenda was present and knew about it.
While the DCFS petition was pending, Jaclyn was hospitalized for suicide ideation. While she was in the hospital, Glenda informed the DCFS caseworker that she no longer wanted Jaclyn in her home due to the possible risk she believed Jaclyn posed to her younger sibling as well as Glenda's unborn child. DCFS filed an amended section 300 petition to add another basis for jurisdiction under subdivision (b), namely that Glenda N. was "unable and unwilling to provide for the necessities of life . . . due to the child's special needs," thus "endanger[ing] the child's physical and emotional health, safety and well being and plac[ing] the child at risk of physical and emotional harm."
Following a hearing, the dependency court dismissed the allegation under subdivision (a) of section 300. However, the court sustained the petition under subdivision (b), for failure to protect, citing four separate grounds. First, the court found that Glenda should have known of the sexual abuse by Christian, and that the sexual abuse and Glenda's failure to protect Jaclyn placed Jaclyn at risk of harm. Second, the court found that Glenda should have known of the sexual abuse by her husband. Third, the court determined that Glenda failed to take action to protect Jaclyn when she knew the child was being physically abused by Christian. Fourth, the court found jurisdiction was proper because the mother was "unable and unwilling to provide for the necessities of life . . . due to the child's special needs." The court also sustained the petition under subdivision (d) of section 300, based on the sexual abuse by both Christian and the husband.
The court ordered that Jaclyn be removed from Glenda's custody. The court also ordered family reunification services for Jaclyn and Glenda, including monitored visits, individual counseling for both Jaclyn and Glenda, and conjoint counseling when Jaclyn's therapist deemed it appropriate.
This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Glenda does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the dependency court's finding of jurisdiction under section 300 subdivision (b) on the grounds that she failed to protect minor from physical abuse and was unwilling to have the minor in her home. Nor does she challenge the minor's placement or any portion of the case plan. Glenda requests only that we reverse for insufficient evidence the jurisdictional findings that Jaclyn came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d) due to the fact that Glenda reasonably should have known that her husband and adult son were sexually abusing Jaclyn. She argues that we should review these specific findings for two reasons: first, the findings could have "very negative repercussions" in future criminal proceedings or in family law proceedings involving Glenda's other minor son, who is subject to joint custody with a different father; and second, Glenda will face "social opprobrium" as a result of the allegation that she ignored her daughter's sexual abuse. For the reasons that follow, we decline to consider whether sufficient evidence supported the dependency court's findings that Glenda reasonably should have known of the sexual abuse.
"`We uphold judgments if they are correct for any reason, "regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which the court reached its conclusion." [Citation.] "It is judicial action and not judicial reasoning which is the subject of review. . . ."' [Citation.] We will not reverse for error unless it appears reasonably probable that, absent the error, the appellant would have obtained a more favorable result." (In re Jonathan B.(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 876 (Jonathan B.).) Thus, "[w]hen a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court's jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence." (In re Alexis E.(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451; accord,In re Shelley J.(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 330;Jonathan B., supra,5 Cal.App.4th at p. 875.)
Here, Glenda concedes the dependency court has jurisdiction under section 300 based on its findings that Glenda failed to take action to protect Jaclyn from physical abuse from her adult brother, and because she was unable and unwilling to provide for Jaclyn. Therefore, we need not consider whether substantial evidence supported the dependency court's other jurisdictional findings.
Nor do we find compelling reasons in this case to exercise discretion to reach the merits of Glenda's arguments. Notably, Glenda does not contend that "if [her] challenge is successful, there could be an impact on . . . placement and reunification orders" issued by the dependency court. (In re John S.(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143.) She does not argue that reversal of the jurisdictional findings would have any effect on Jaclyn's dependency case at all. Rather, Glenda vaguely alleges that she herself could be prejudiced in future criminal proceedings or custody disputes over another minor child. However, "the paramount purpose underlying dependency proceedings is the protection of the child" and Glenda "does not represent `a competing interest in this respect.' [Citation.]" (Jonathan B., supra,5 Cal.App.4th at p. 877.) In addition, given the serious nature of the jurisdictional findings to which Glenda acquiesces — that she failed to protect Jaclyn from physical abuse and was unwilling to care for her — we are not persuaded that we should take up the issue of whether Glenda knew of the sexual abuse because Glenda will face "social opprobrium" as a result of this allegation.
Therefore, without considering the sufficiency of the evidence that Glenda reasonably should have known that Jaclyn was being sexually abused, we affirm the dependency court's order.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
MANELLA, J.
SUZUKAWA, J.